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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case arises from a slip-and-fall suffered by Marie 
Saldana at a Kmart store on St. Croix. Ms. Saldana appeals 
the grant of summary judgment against her while her 
attorney, Lee Rohn, Esq., appeals the imposition of 
sanctions against her for her out-of-court vulgar language 
in a handful of cases, including this one. The tortuous 
procedural history that has led to the consolidation of a slip 
in a puddle of car wax with sanctions for vulgar language 
need not detain us. Suffice it to say that we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and will affirm the 
District Court's December 20, 1999 decision with respect to 
Saldana, but will reverse with respect to Rohn. 
 
I. 
 
Marie Saldana alleged in her complaint that she slipped 
in a puddle of car wax in a Kmart aisle on April 20, 1995 
and suffered injury. No one saw the wax before Saldana fell, 
no one else slipped in the puddle, and Saldana did not see 
tracks of wax near the puddle that might indicate someone 
else had stepped in the spill. Saldana stated that after she 
fell, she noticed that the puddle measured 24 inches across 
and was covered with a layer of light brown dust. A Kmart 
employee, Eugenie Williams, had walked down the same 
aisle less than three minutes prior to Saldana's fall and saw 
no wax on the floor at that time. After Saldana fell, Williams 
spotted an unbroken, completely empty bottle of wax on the 
floor with its top off. 
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Kmart brought a motion for summary judgment. In 
response, Saldana offered no evidence that any Kmart 
representative knew of the spill. Rather, she attempted to 
show constructive notice through the expert testimony of 
Rosie Mackay, proffered as a safety engineer, and her own 
testimony regarding the dust on the puddle. Saldana 
offered two reports by Mackay: an initial report dated 
January 1997, and a supplemental report dated April 1997. 
In the January report, Mackay concluded that "K-Mart was 
negligent in that there was a spill, and it was not cleaned 
up. Ms. Saldana was the unfortunate victim of this act of 
poor housekeeping . . . ." App. at 361. Mackay based this 
conclusion in part on safety regulations promulgated 
pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
("OSHA"). Mackay's April report detailed the results of 
"pouring tests" she conducted to determine the length of 
time it would take for the same brand of wax to escape 
from an inverted bottle and form a 12-inch puddle on her 
kitchen floor. At her deposition, Mackay discussed 
additional experiments carried out in June 1997 involving 
open bottles lying on their sides. The District Court found 
Mackay's opinions and tests to be "irrelevant under Rule 
402, . . . confusing or misleading under Rule 403, and . . . 
technically (scientifically) unreliable under Rule 702." 
Saldana v. Kmart, 84 F. Supp.2d 629, 636 (D.V.I. 1999). 
The Court also found that any observation of dust on the 
puddle after Saldana's fall was not relevant to the state of 
the wax before the fall. Id. Thus, the Court granted Kmart's 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, 
we exercise plenary review and apply the same test a 
district court applies. Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 
768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). "Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c), that test is whether there is a genuine 
issue of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting 
Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d 
Cir. 1992). "In so deciding, a court must view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw 
all inferences in that party's favor." Id. A court should find 
for the moving party "if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). 
The party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading"; its 
response, "by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
"[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient 
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return 
a verdict for that party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Such 
affirmative evidence -- regardless of whether it is direct or 
circumstantial -- must amount to more than a scintilla, 
but may amount to less (in the evaluation of the court) 
than a preponderance." Williams v. Borough of West 
Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Because Saldana does not allege actual notice on the part 
of Kmart, she would ultimately be required to show that the 
wax was "on the floor long enough to give [Kmart] 
constructive notice of this potential `unreasonable risk of 
harm.' " David v. Pueblo Supermarket, 740 F.2d 230, 234 
(3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts S 343 
(1965)). Although it is uncontested that the wax was on the 
floor at the time of the fall, "the mere presence of the 
foreign substance does not establish whether it had been 
there a few seconds, a few minutes, a few hours or even a 
few days before the accident." Id. Circumstantial evidence 
that a substance was left on the floor for an inordinate 
period of time can be enough to constitute negligence; 
where a plaintiff points to such evidence, it is a question of 
fact for the jury whether, under all the circumstances, the 
defective condition of the floor existed long enough so that 
it would have been discovered with the exercise of 
reasonable care. Id. at 236. Put another way, Saldana must 
point to evidence that would allow the jury to infer that the 
wax was on Kmart's floor for some minimum amount of 
time before the accident. Only then could a jury begin to 
consider whether under the circumstances the amount of 
time indicated by the evidence establishes constructive 
notice. 
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To show that the wax was on Kmart's floor an 
unreasonable length of time, Saldana relied chiefly on the 
information submitted by her expert, Rosie Mackay. As the 
District Court noted, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes 
three major requirements as to expert opinions: (1) the 
witness must be an expert; (2) the procedures and methods 
used must be reliable; and (3) the testimony must"fit" the 
factual dispute at issue so that it will assist the jury. See 
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999); 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590-93 
(1993); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d 
Cir. 1985). Even if the evidence offered by the expert 
witness satisfies Rule 702, it may still be excluded if its 
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury." Fed. R. of Evid. 403. 
 
We will assume arguendo, as did the District Court, that 
Mackay meets the requirements of an "expert." Even so, 
Mackay's reports and conclusions would not be admissible. 
In her January report, Mackay concluded that, although 
Kmart purports to follow safety procedures similar to 
certain OSHA regulations, "K-Mart was negligent in that 
there was a spill, and it was not cleaned up." App. at 361. 
Kmart "allowed" the wax to spill, Mackay wrote, and 
therefore "failed to use good, logical, prudent safety 
precautions." App. at 362. These conclusory statements 
essentially attempt to force upon Kmart a strict liability 
standard based on Mackay's reading of OSHA, a regulatory 
scheme far different from the applicable law described 
above. To be sure, in Rolick v. Collins Pine Co. , 975 F.2d 
1009 (3d Cir. 1992), this Court found admissible an 
expert's opinion that the defendant violated OSHA 
standards. Id. at 1014. That case, however, applied 
Pennsylvania law, and we noted that Pennsylvania courts 
had previously borrowed OSHA regulations for use as 
evidence of the standard of care owed to plaintiffs. Id. 
 
This case is guided by the Restatement of Torts, which 
governs in the Virgin Islands in the absence of a local 
statute. 1 V.I.C. S 4. Under the Restatement,"[t]he court 
will not adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable 
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an 
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administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be 
exclusively . . . to protect a class of persons other than the 
one whose interests are invaded." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, S 288; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts S 286, 
Illust. 1 (safety statute for protection of employees does not 
define standard of care owed to business invitee). As we 
have stated, Kmart is liable in this negligence action only if 
it knew or should have known of the dangerous condition 
but failed to take reasonable steps to correct it. David, 740 
F.2d at 234. Thus, Mackay's opinion that Kmart violated 
worker safety requirements would not assist the fact finder 
in deciding whether Kmart unreasonably failed to detect a 
wax spill that injured a business invitee. Mackay's April 
report includes similar conclusory statements that the 
District Court properly found would not be admissible at 
trial. 
 
Mackay's April pour tests indicated that, depending on 
the technique used, a bottle of the wax at issue would take 
almost three minutes to empty and an additional five 
minutes to form a 12-inch puddle. For her June tests, 
Mackay altered the pour angle and found a 14- to 15-inch 
puddle would form in about eight minutes. The District 
Court believed that the primary concern with these tests 
was not their accuracy, but their relevancy.1 Saldana 
connects these tests to the size of the Kmart puddle after 
her fall and argues the time involved establishes 
constructive notice. Undisputed evidence shows, however, 
that Saldana's fall and her recovery from that fall left her 
legs and skirt wet with car wax. This disturbance 
undoubtedly altered the size of the puddle; measurements 
of how quickly wax spreads without such interference 
simply have no bearing on this case. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note in passing, however, that Mackay conducted her pour tests 
on what she called a "vinyl tile surface particularly similar to the one 
at 
K-Mart." App. at 366. As we have already mentioned, this "vinyl tile 
surface" turned out to be Mackay's own kitchen floor, which she testified 
was at least 17 years old. Mackay further stated that the Kmart floor 
appeared to be significantly newer than her own; she also did not know 
whether the two floors had been cleaned with the same type of 
substance or resembled each other in any way relevant to her tests. We 
are, therefore, not persuaded that the accuracy of these tests was not 
also a concern. 
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Similarly, the time necessary for a wax bottle to empty 
does not, by itself, provide information regarding when the 
spill commenced or concluded. Nothing in the record 
indicates exactly when the bottle was found to be 
completely empty, leaving no way to deduce when the spill 
began. The spill may have started just as Saldana reached 
the aisle and continued as she fell, as she was being helped 
up, or even afterward. The District Court, therefore, 
properly rejected Mackay's reports.2 
 
The only other evidence Saldana points to regarding the 
amount of time the wax was on Kmart's floor is her 
observation of dust on the puddle after she fell. We note, 
however, as did the District Court, that Saldana offered no 
evidence of how much dust was found, how long it would 
have taken for dust to accumulate, or whether the dust was 
picked up off the floor by the spreading wax or the force of 
Saldana's fall. Standing alone, the mere presence of dust on 
the wax after Saldana's fall does not inform any decision as 
to the amount of time the wax was on the floor before the 
fall. 
 
We, therefore, find that Saldana's case rests solely on 
speculation that events unfolded in such a way as to render 
Kmart negligent.3 There was a complete absence of relevant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because we find all of the pour tests irrelevant, we need not decide 
whether the District Court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of 
tests conducted after the deadline for producing expert reports. We also 
note that the June tests, which purport to measure the amount of time 
wax takes to pour out of bottles lying flat on the ground, involved 
emptying only half the wax out of the bottle. Saldana, however, claims 
that the bottle at the time of her fall was empty. Reply Br. at 19 
(calling 
the evidence that the bottle was completely empty an"un-controverted 
fact, indeed an admission."). 
 
3. Saldana argues that a jury could find that either Williams or a second 
Kmart employee working behind a nearby counter negligently failed to 
keep a proper lookout. A jury might, indeed, find that constructive notice 
requires a shorter amount of time when a spill occurs in an area of the 
store near an employee rather than in some remote aisle far from 
workers' eyes. Because Saldana does not allege that Kmart had actual 
notice of the spill, however, the relevant question continues to be 
whether the wax was on the floor long enough that some Kmart 
representative should have known about it. 
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evidence -- from either side -- on the critical question of 
how long the wax was on the floor, and the mere possibility 
that something occurred in a particular way is not enough, 
as a matter of law, for a jury to find it probably happened 
that way. See Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, 82 F.3d 
69, 75 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying New Jersey law); Lanni v. 
Pennsylvania RR, 371 Pa. 106, 111-12 (1952) (finding of 
constructive notice impossible where no evidence existed to 
show how long oily spot was on the floor); Richardson v. 
Ames Ave. Corp., 525 N.W. 2d 212, 217 (Neb. 1995) 
(holding a store not liable for a customer's slip and fall on 
liquid soap where no evidence showed how long spill had 
existed).4 As the authors of the Restatement put it in one 
particularly pertinent illustration: 
 
       A, a customer in B's store, slips on a banana peel near 
       the door, and falls and is injured. The banana peel is 
       fresh, and there is no evidence as to how long it has 
       been on the floor. Since it is at least equally probable 
       that it was dropped by a third person so short a time 
       before that B had no reasonable opportunity to 
       discover and remove it, it cannot be inferred that its 
       presence was due to the negligence of B. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, S 328D, Illust. 7 (discussing 
res ipsa loquitur). We find the facts here indistinguishable 
from the Restatement example. While a plaintiff need not 
prove his or her case by a preponderance of the evidence to 
survive summary judgment, Saldana has not met even her 
modest burden of showing at least some relevant evidence 
that could support her claim. Accordingly, we will affirm 
the District Court's grant of summary judgment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Saldana cites Rhoades v. Kmart, 863 P.2d 626 (Wyo. 1993) for the 
proposition that whether a slippery substance was on the floor and how 
long it had been there are questions for the jury to determine. Rhoades, 
863 P.2d at 630. The Rhoades Court noted, however, that the soda cup 
lid and straw found at the scene were dry, which would permit an 
inference that the soda had been on the floor a sufficient length of time 
for constructive notice. Id. at 630. The Wyoming Court also based its 
decision on an "operating methods" doctrine that neither party has 
argued applies to the present case. Id. at 630-31 (evidence showed that 
soda was available in the store, that soda had been spilled before, and 
therefore that Kmart might expect soda to be spilled at any time). 
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II. 
 
While discovery was taking place in the Saldana case, 
Andrew C. Simpson, Esq., then of the firm of Bryant, White 
& Barnes, P.C., attorneys for Kmart, moved before the 
District Court for sanctions against Saldana's attorney, Lee 
Rohn, because of her use of language that he contended, in 
somewhat of an overstatement, violated the "fundamental 
precepts of legal ethics." App. at 133. As the memorandum 
in support of the motion succinctly put it, "[t]he basis for 
this motion is Attorney Rohn's repeated use of vulgarity, in 
particular the word `fuck,' towards other members of the 
bar." Id. The motion was prompted by Rohn telling 
Simpson, in the course of a disagreement on the telephone 
over scheduling depositions, "you know, Andy, go fuck 
yourself." Id. at 178. The memorandum complained that 
Rohn "routinely" used the word "fuck" upon disagreeing 
with opposing counsel. Id. at 134. 
 
A few preliminary comments. First, we do not condone 
Rohn's concededly rather free-wheeling use of the word 
"fuck," and nothing that follows should be taken as any 
indication that we do. Second, there is no contention that 
at any time Rohn used that word or any vulgar language 
before the District Court or in any document submitted to 
the Court. Third, there is a long and not particularly happy 
history between Rohn and at least one other member of the 
Bryant firm in addition to Simpson who, we note, rebuffed 
Rohn's immediate attempt to apologize after the telephone 
incident. This history is not only readily apparent from the 
rather scathing submissions made by both sides, but from 
the fact that the motion and memorandum, although filed 
a mere three days after the fateful telephone disagreement, 
included a host of exhibits documenting, among other 
things, numerous occasions on which Rohn used the word 
between October 1993 and February 1997. This litany of 
incidents prompted Rohn to conclude that the firm had 
been "accumulating ammo" against her, id . at 190; whether 
or not that be the case, the history here certainly permits 
the conclusion that the firm's attempt to portray itself as 
something akin to a knight in shining armor protecting the 
bar and the public from "such conduct" and preventing the 
"further degradation of the administration of justice and the 
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reputation of the Virgin Island Bar," id. at 136-37, may well 
be overstating its case. 
 
Rohn opposed Kmart's motion, and the District Court 
held a hearing, which, by order of the Court, was to have 
been limited "solely to the issue of Attorney Rohn's behavior 
in this case." Id. at 367. After the hearing commenced, 
however, the Court stated that it had not intended by that 
order to limit the inquiry to this case but, rather, had 
intended to limit the inquiry to Rohn's behavior in District 
Court cases, and the scope of the hearing expanded 
accordingly. Id. at 494, 496.5  Kmart essentially rested on its 
papers and only Rohn testified, apologizing in the course of 
her testimony and promising to refrain from use of the 
word in the future. The Court, seemingly satisfied that 
Rohn had seen the error of her ways, barely touched on the 
issue of sanctions but stated that an opinion should and 
would issue giving very clear advice to the bar as to how 
attorneys are supposed to conduct themselves in and out of 
court. Id. at 537. That opinion issued more than two years 
after the hearing when the Court invoked Local Rule 83.2 
and, in very strong language, sanctioned Rohn by ordering 
her to attend a legal education seminar on civility in the 
legal profession, write numerous letters of apology to all 
whom "she demeaned and insulted by her vulgarity and 
abusive conduct," apologize to the court reporters present 
at any of those proceedings, and pay the attorneys' fees and 
costs associated with bringing the sanctions motion. 
Saldana, 84 F.Supp. at 641.6 
 
We generally review a court's imposition of sanctions for 
abuse of discretion. Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 55 
(1991); In re: Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation, 120 F.3d 
368, 387 (3d Cir. 1997). When the procedure the District 
Court uses in imposing sanctions raises due process issues 
of fair notice and the right to be heard, this Court's review 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note, without comment, that when the motion was filed, Rohn 
sought a continuance so that witnesses to the conduct alleged in the 
motion could be available to testify on her behalf. The Court denied the 
motion and entered the above quoted order. Thus, when, without notice, 
the hearing expanded, only Rohn was there to testify. 
 
6. Those fees and costs were later determined to be $4,542.00. 
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is plenary. Tutu Wells, 120 F.3d at 387; Martin v. Brown, 63 
F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Rohn argues with considerable force that the District 
Court violated her due process rights to fair notice by 
failing to specify in advance of the hearing that sanctions 
would or at least could be premised on Local Rule 83.2. 
Generally, "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment requires a federal court to provide notice and 
an opportunity to be heard before sanctions are imposed on 
a litigant or attorney." Martin, 63 F.3d at 1262. In 
particular, "[t]he party against whom sanctions are being 
considered is entitled to notice of the legal rule on which 
the sanctions would be based, the reasons for the 
sanctions, and the form of the potential sanctions." Tutu 
Wells, 120 F.3d at 379 (citing Simmerman v. Corino, 27 
F.3d at 58, 64 (3d Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in the original). 
"[O]nly with this information can a party respond to the 
court's concerns in an intelligent manner." Id. In other 
words, a party cannot adequately defend himself or herself 
against the imposition of sanctions unless he or she is 
aware of the issues that must be addressed to avoid the 
sanctions. Id. 
 
Local Rule 83.2, which was adopted by the District Court 
in furtherance of the Court's inherent power to supervise 
attorney conduct and essentially codifies certain aspects of 
that power, was first mentioned by the Court in its opinion 
imposing sanctions, when it purported to base its 
sanctioning authority on that rule. That notification simply 
came too late, however, because Rule 83.2 was never 
pressed by Kmart as the basis for sanctions, was never 
mentioned at the hearing,7 and no one -- not the Court, not 
Kmart, and not Rohn -- ever even alluded to the 
procedures of Rule 83.2(b)(5), much less argued why they 
should, or should not, be followed.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The passing reference in a footnote in Kmart's reply to Rohn's 
opposition to the sanctions motion to the fact that the Court could "also" 
use Rule 83.2 to investigate "all" Rohn's misconduct, App. at 300, is the 
only prior reference to Rule 83.2. Thus, the District Court's statement 
that Kmart "relied heavily" on that Rule, id. at 634, was erroneous. 
 
8. Under Rule 83.2(b)(5), the Chief Judge, if he deems it appropriate, 
shall refer a complaint to counsel to investigate and prosecute a 
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While Rohn clearly did not have notice that sanctions 
could be imposed under Rule 83.2, she just as clearly did 
know that a Court has the inherent authority to impose 
sanctions and knew that sanctions up to and including a 
suspension of her license to practice were a possibility, 
although given the Court's last minute apparent about-face 
as to the scope of the hearing, it is less than clear what 
conduct she had notice would be considered for purposes of 
sanctions. We need not, however, decide whether an 
imposition of sanctions can be affirmed even after the 
purported basis of those sanctions has been rejected or 
whether there was some failure of due process, because we 
find that the quality and quantity of the transgressions 
found by the District Court -- four uses of the word "fuck," 
two in telephone conversations with attorneys and two in 
asides to attorneys during depositions, and a post-verdict 
letter in which Rohn concurred with a juror who described 
an expert witness as a "Nazi" -- simply do not support the 
invocation of the Court's inherent powers. Stated 
differently, we agree with Rohn that her use of language, 
while certainly not pretty, did not rise to the level necessary 
to trigger sanctions, at least under the Court's inherent 
powers.9 
 
       "Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be 
       vested, by their very creation, with power to impose 
       silence, respect[ ] and decorum[ ] in their presence, and 
       submission to their lawful mandates." Anderson v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
formal disciplinary proceeding or make some other appropriate 
recommendation. The order of reference to counsel, and all further 
proceedings until the issuance of an order initiating a formal 
disciplinary 
action, shall be under seal. A judge would hear the matter and thereafter 
submit findings of fact, conclusions of law, and any recommendation to 
the full Court for action. 
 
9. Parenthetically, we note, in this connection, our dismay that Mr. 
Simpson, in the memorandum in support of this motion, attempted to 
portray Rohn's conduct as "far more egregious than that of the attorney 
in In re Tutu Wells," App. at 136, a case in which, among other things, 
the attorney in question during a status conference before the court 
"made an obscene gesture, pantomiming masturbation" while a woman 
attorney was making a presentation on behalf of her client. In re: Tutu 
Wells, 31 V.I. 175, 177 (D.V.I. 1994). 
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       Dunn, [19 U.S. 204, 227] (1821); see also Ex parte 
       Robinson, [86 U.S. 505, 510] (1874). These powers are 
       "governed not by rule or statute but by the control 
       necessarily vested in courts to manage their own 
       affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
       disposition of cases." Link v. Wabash R. Co. , 370 U.S. 
       626, 630-631 (1962). 
 
        Prior cases have outlined the scope of the inherent 
       power of the federal courts. For example, the Court has 
       held that a federal court has the power to control 
       admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who 
       appear before it. See Ex parte Burr, [22 U.S. 529, 531] 
       (1824). While this power "ought to be exercised with 
       great caution," it is nevertheless "incidental to all 
       Courts." Ibid. 
 
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43. The Chambers  Court also 
warned that "[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent 
powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion." Id. 
at 44 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 
764 (1980). We have, on more than one occasion, repeated 
that admonition. See, e.g., Prosser v. Prosser, 186 F.3d 403, 
406 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999); Martin, 63 F.3d at 1265; Fellheimer, 
Eichen & Braverman, P.C., v. Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 
F.3d 1215, 1224 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
The language complained of in this case did not occur in 
the presence of the Court and there is no evidence that it 
affected either the affairs of the Court or the"orderly and 
expeditious disposition" of any cases before it. Moreover, as 
the Chambers Court observed, a court should normally look 
first to rule-based or statute-based powers and reserve 
inherent powers for those times when rule- or statute- 
based powers are not "up to the task." Chambers, 501 U.S. 
at 50. As we put it in Martin, "[g]enerally, a court's inherent 
power should be reserved for those cases in which the 
conduct of a party or an attorney is egregious and no other 
basis for sanctions exists," presumably why the Court, 
albeit belatedly, purported to base these sanctions on Rule 
83.2. Martin, 63 F.3d at 1265. 
 
In addition to the fact that were sanctions warranted, 
Rule 83.2 would have been "up to the task," nothing 
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"egregious" is evident here. Indeed, the District Court 
described itself as a "kindergarten cop" refereeing a dispute 
between attorneys. Saldana, 84 F. Supp.2d at 640. The 
petty and long-simmering nature of the dispute is, perhaps, 
best seen in some of the icing put on the cake: In addition 
to using the word "fuck," Rohn allegedly "sucked her teeth" 
(whatever that means) at a witness during a deposition, 
App. at 136; on another occasion, she used the word 
"bullshit," id. at 301; she also "frequently raises her voice 
to an unacceptable level," id. at 293; and once, after getting 
an answer she did not like at a deposition, she 
"pantomimed a gagging gesture (placing her finger in her 
mouth as if triggering the vomiting reflex)," with her side of 
the story being that she was trying to remove a splinter 
from her finger. Id. Rohn, of course, fought back at the 
same high level. Within a few days of the filing of the 
sanctions motion, for example, she had canvassed other 
plaintiffs' counsel and confirmed that "they have had to 
hang up on Attorney Simpson due to his rudeness and also 
find him rude and obnoxious to deal with." Id . at 125. 
Shortly thereafter, Rohn's partner submitted an affidavit 
stating that he had "on over a dozen occasions, utilized the 
`F ' word in discussions with Attorney Simpson" as well as 
in "literally hundreds of phone calls with other lawyers" 
without receiving one complaint; he also stated that 
"Simpson has similarly utilized the `F ' word." Id. at 199. 
 
We thus return to where we began -- a handful of uses 
of the word that supposedly so offended counsel for Kmart 
that he felt compelled to move for sanctions under the 
Court's inherent powers. Because the District Court abused 
its discretion in granting that motion, we will reverse. 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of 
December 20, 1999 will be affirmed in part and reversed in 
part. 
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